1Next, as was proposed, let us speak about beneficence and liberality, than which indeed nothing is better suited to the nature of man, but it calls for many precautions. 1For we must see, first, that kindness does not harm either those very people to whom it will seem to be shown kindly or anyone else; next, that the kindness is not greater than our means; then, that to each it is given according to his worth; 1for that is the foundation of justice, to which all these things must be referred. 1For those who do someone a favour that harms the very person they seem to wish to help are to be judged not beneficent or liberal but ruinous flatterers; and those who injure some people in order to be liberal to others are guilty of the same injustice as if they were turning others' property to their own use.
43There are, moreover, many people, and those indeed eager for splendour and glory, who snatch from some what they may lavish on others, and they think that they will be seen as beneficent towards their friends if they enrich them by any means whatever. 43But this is so far from duty that nothing could be more contrary to duty. 43We must see to it, therefore, that we practise the kind of liberality which helps our friends and harms no one. 43Therefore the transfer of money by Lucius Sulla and Gaius Caesar from its rightful owners to strangers ought not to seem liberal; 43for nothing is liberal which is not also just.
44The second point of caution was that kindness should not be greater than our means, because those who wish to be more generous than their resources allow go wrong first in this, that they do injury to their nearest; 44for the wealth which it is fairer should be supplied to them and left to them, they transfer to strangers. 44Besides, in liberality of this kind there is generally a desire to seize and carry off wrongfully, so that there may be resources enough for lavish giving. 44One may see, too, that very many people, not so much liberal by nature as led by a kind of love of glory, do many things in order to seem beneficent, things which seem to spring from display rather than from goodwill.
44Such pretence, however, is more closely allied to vanity than to either liberality or honour. 45The third point proposed was that in beneficence there should be a discrimination according to worth; 45in which we must consider both the character of the person on whom the benefit will be conferred, and his feeling towards us, and the fellowship and partnership of our lives, and the services previously rendered for our advantage; 45that all these should coincide is desirable; 45if not, the more numerous and the weightier considerations will have the greater weight.