1But since we live not with men who are perfect and entirely wise, but with those in whom it is a fine thing if they show likenesses of virtue, I think we must understand this too: that no one at all is to be neglected in whom some sign of virtue appears, but that each person is to be cherished most in proportion as he is most adorned with these gentler virtues, moderation, self-control, and this very justice about which much has already been said. 1For a brave and great spirit in a man who is not perfect or wise is generally too fiery; those other virtues seem rather to belong to the good man.
1So much for character. 47As for the goodwill which each person may have towards us, the first point of duty is that we give most to the one by whom we are most loved; but let us judge goodwill not, as youths do, by a certain ardour of affection, but rather by its steadiness and constancy. 47But if there are services already done, so that gratitude is not to be begun but repaid, a greater degree of care must be applied; 47for no duty is more necessary than repaying gratitude. 48But if Hesiod bids us return what we have received for use in greater measure, if only we can, what ought we to do when challenged by a kindness?
48Should we not imitate fertile fields, which bring forth much more than they have received? 48For if we do not hesitate to confer services on those who we hope will be of use to us, how ought we to behave towards those who have already been of use? 48For since there are two kinds of liberality, one of giving a benefit, the other of returning one, whether we give or not is in our own power, but not to return one is not permitted to a good man, provided he can do so without injustice. 49Among benefits received, moreover, distinctions must be made, and there is no doubt that the most is owed to each in proportion to the greatness of the benefit.
49In this, however, we must weigh above all with what spirit, zeal and goodwill each has acted. 49For many do many things with a kind of rashness, without judgement, either from a morbid urge towards everyone or driven by a sudden impulse of the mind, as if by a gust of wind; 49such benefits are not to be held as equally great as those which are bestowed with judgement, deliberately and consistently. 49But in conferring a benefit and in repaying gratitude, if other things are equal, it is above all a matter of duty to help each person most in proportion as he most needs help; 49but most people do the opposite; 49for the person from whom they hope for most, even if he does not need them, is the one they serve most eagerly.