1As, then, to admonish and be admonished is the mark of true friendship, and to do the one freely, not harshly, and to receive the other patiently, not resentfully, so we must hold that there is no greater plague in friendship than fawning, flattery and obsequiousness: for by however many names it is called, this vice must be branded as belonging to fickle and deceitful men, who say everything to please and nothing for the truth. 92And while pretence in all things is wrong (for it destroys the judgement of truth and corrupts it), it is most of all opposed to friendship; 92for it destroys truth, without which the name of friendship can have no force.
92For since the power of friendship lies in this, that one mind, as it were, is made out of many, how can that happen if not even in a single person is there one mind, always the same, but a mind changeable, fickle and manifold? 93For what can be so pliable, so wayward, as the mind of a man who turns not only with another's feeling and wish, but even with his look and nod? 93'Someone says no, I say no; 93he says yes, I say yes; 93in short, I have ordered myself to agree with everything,' as the same Terence says, but he says it in the character of Gnatho, and to take up a friend of that kind at all is a mark of fickleness.
94But there are many like Gnatho, though superior in rank, fortune and reputation, whose flattery is harmful, since authority has been added to emptiness. 95A flattering friend can be distinguished and told apart from a true one, if care is used, just as everything painted and pretended can be from what is genuine and true. 95A public assembly, though it consists of the most ignorant people, nevertheless usually judges what difference there is between a demagogue, that is, a flattering and shallow citizen, and one who is steadfast, true and serious. 96With what flatteries Gaius Papirius lately flowed into the ears of the assembly, when he was proposing a law for the re-election of tribunes of the plebs!
96I spoke against it, but I shall say nothing of myself; of Scipio I shall speak more gladly. 96What dignity he had, immortal gods, what majesty in his speech! 96so that you would readily have called him the leader of the Roman people, not their companion. 96But you were there, and the speech is in everyone's hands. 96And so the popular law was rejected by the votes of the people. 96And, to return to myself, you remember, in the consulship of Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus, how popular the law of Gaius Licinius Crassus about the priesthoods seemed; 96for the co-optation of the colleges was being transferred to the gift of the people.
96(And he was the first to begin the practice of facing towards the Forum when addressing the people.) Yet reverence for the immortal gods, with me defending it, easily overcame his saleable speech. 96And this took place when I was praetor, five years before I was made consul. 96Thus that cause was defended by its own merits more than by the highest authority.