1But how duties are derived from those parts which belong to moral goodness seems to have been sufficiently explained. 1But among those very things which are honourable there can often arise a conflict and comparison, as to which of two honourable things is more honourable, a topic that was passed over by Panaetius. 1For since all moral goodness flows from four sources, one of which is knowledge, the second fellowship, the third greatness of spirit, the fourth moderation, these must often be compared with one another in choosing a duty. 153I hold, then, that those duties which are derived from fellowship are more in accordance with nature than those derived from knowledge, and this can be confirmed by the following argument: if such a life should befall the wise man that, with abundant supplies of everything, he could ponder and contemplate by himself, in complete leisure, all things worthy of knowledge, yet if his solitude were so great that he could see no human being, he would depart from life.
153And the foremost of all the virtues is that wisdom which the Greeks call sophia (for by prudence, which the Greeks call phronēsis, we understand something else, which is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be avoided; 153but that wisdom which I called foremost is the knowledge of things divine and human, in which is contained the fellowship of gods and men and their society with one another); 153if this is the greatest, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that the duty which is derived from fellowship is the greatest. 153For knowledge and contemplation of nature would be in a way maimed and incomplete if no practical action followed.
153But such action is seen above all in protecting the interests of men; 153it concerns, therefore, the society of the human race; 153and so it must be ranked above knowledge. 154And the best men show and judge this by their very conduct. 154For who is so eager in examining and learning the nature of things that, if, while he was handling and contemplating subjects most worthy of knowledge, news were suddenly brought to him of peril and crisis for his country, which he could relieve and help, he would not abandon and cast aside all those things, even if he thought he could count the stars or measure the size of the universe?
154and he would do the same in the affairs or danger of a parent or a friend. 155From these things it is understood that the duties of justice, which concern the welfare of men, than which nothing ought to be more sacred to a man, must be preferred to the pursuits and duties of knowledge.