Off. 1.43.1Sed ab iīs partibus, quae sunt honestātis, quem ad modum officia dūcerentur, satis expositum vidētur.But how duties are derived from those parts which belong to moral goodness seems to have been sufficiently explained. Off. 1.43.1Eōrum autem ipsōrum, quae honesta sunt, potest incidere saepe contentiō et comparātiō, dē duōbus honestīs utrum honestius, quī locus ā Panaetiō est praetermissus.But among those very things which are honourable there can often arise a conflict and comparison, as to which of two honourable things is more honourable, a topic that was passed over by Panaetius. Off. 1.43.1Nam cum omnis honestās manet ā partibus quattuor, quārum ūna sit cognitiōnis, altera commūnitātis, tertia magnanimitātis, quarta moderātiōnis, haec in dēligendō officiō saepe inter sē comparentur necesse est.For since all moral goodness flows from four sources, one of which is knowledge, the second fellowship, the third greatness of spirit, the fourth moderation, these must often be compared with one another in choosing a duty. Off. 1.43.153Placet igitur aptiōra esse nātūrae ea officia, quae ex commūnitāte, quam ea, quae ex cognitiōne dūcantur, idque hōc argūmentō cōnfirmārī potest, quod, sī contigerit ea vīta sapientī, ut omnium rērum affluentibus cōpiīs omnia, quae cognitiōne digna sint, summō ōtiō sēcum ipse cōnsīderet et contemplētur, tamen, sī sōlitūdō tanta sit, ut hominem vidēre nōn possit, excēdat ē vītā.I hold, then, that those duties which are derived from fellowship are more in accordance with nature than those derived from knowledge, and this can be confirmed by the following argument: if such a life should befall the wise man that, with abundant supplies of everything, he could ponder and contemplate by himself, in complete leisure, all things worthy of knowledge, yet if his solitude were so great that he could see no human being, he would depart from life.
Off. 1.43.153Prīncepsque omnium virtūtum illa sapientia, quam Graecī vocant prūdentiam—enim quam, Graecī dīcunt aliam quandam, intellegimus quae est, rērum expetendārum fugiendārum que scientia scientia;And the foremost of all the virtues is that wisdom which the Greeks call sophia (for by prudence, which the Greeks call phronēsis, we understand something else, which is the knowledge of things to be sought and to be avoided; Off. 1.43.153illa autem sapientia, quam prīncipem dīxī, rērum est dīvīnārum et hūmānārum scientia, in quā continētur deōrum et hominum commūnitās et societās inter ipsōs;but that wisdom which I called foremost is the knowledge of things divine and human, in which is contained the fellowship of gods and men and their society with one another); Off. 1.43.153ea sī maxima est, ut est certē, necesse est, quod ā commūnitāte dūcātur officium, id esse maximum.if this is the greatest, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that the duty which is derived from fellowship is the greatest. Off. 1.43.153Etenim cognitiō contemplātiōque nātūrae manca quōdam modō atque inchoāta sit, sī nūlla āctiō rērum cōnsequātur.For knowledge and contemplation of nature would be in a way maimed and incomplete if no practical action followed.
Off. 1.43.153Ea autem āctiō in hominum commodīs tuendīs maximē cernitur;But such action is seen above all in protecting the interests of men; Off. 1.43.153pertinet igitur ad societātem generis hūmānī;it concerns, therefore, the society of the human race; Off. 1.43.153ergō haec cognitiōantepōnenda est est.and so it must be ranked above knowledge. Off. 1.43.154Atque id optimus quisque rē ipsā ostendit et iūdicat.And the best men show and judge this by their very conduct. Off. 1.43.154Quis enim est tam cupidus in perspiciendā cognōscendāque rērum nātūrā, ut, sī eī trāctantī contemplantīque rēs cognitiōne dignissimās subitō sit allātum perīculum discrīmenque patriae, cui subvenīre opitulārīque possit, nōn illa omnia relinquat atque abiciat, etiamsī dīnumerāre sē stellās aut mētīrī mundī magnitūdinem posse arbitrētur?For who is so eager in examining and learning the nature of things that, if, while he was handling and contemplating subjects most worthy of knowledge, news were suddenly brought to him of peril and crisis for his country, which he could relieve and help, he would not abandon and cast aside all those things, even if he thought he could count the stars or measure the size of the universe?
Off. 1.43.154atque hoc idem in parentis, in amīcī rē aut perīculō fēcerit.and he would do the same in the affairs or danger of a parent or a friend. Off. 1.43.155Quibus rēbus intellegitur studiīs officiīsque scientiae praepōnenda esse officia iūstitiae, quae pertinent ad hominum ūtilitātem,quā nihil hominī esse dēbet antīquius.From these things it is understood that the duties of justice, which concern the welfare of men, than which nothing ought to be more sacred to a man, must be preferred to the pursuits and duties of knowledge.