Off. 1.2.1Sed cum statuissem scrībere ad tē aliquid hōc tempore, multa posthāc, ab eō ordīrī maximē voluī, quod et aetātī tuae esset aptissimum et auctōritātī meae.But since I had resolved to write something to you at this time, and much hereafter, I wished above all to begin from that which would be most suited both to your age and to my authority. Off. 1.2.1Nam cum multa sint in philosophiā et gravia et ūtilia accūrātē cōpiōsēque ā philosophīs disputāta, lātissimē patēre videntur ea, quae dē officiīs trādita ab illīs et praecepta sunt.For although many weighty and useful subjects in philosophy have been discussed carefully and fully by philosophers, the teachings and precepts they have handed down about duties seem to have the widest range. Off. 1.2.1Nūlla enim vītae pars neque pūblicīs neque prīvātīs neque forēnsibus neque domesticīs in rēbus, neque sī tēcum agās quid, neque sī cum alterō contrahās, vacāre officiō potest, in eōque et colendō sita vītae est honestās omnis et neglegendō turpitūdō.For no part of life, neither in public nor in private affairs, neither in the forum nor at home, neither if you do something on your own account nor if you make an agreement with another, can be free of duty; and in its observance lies all the honour of life, and in its neglect all the disgrace.
Off. 1.2.5Atque haec quidem quaestiō commūnis est omnium philosophōrum;And this question, indeed, is common to all philosophers; Off. 1.2.5quis est enim, quī nūllīs officiī praeceptīs trādendīs philosophum sē audeat dīcere?for who is there who would dare to call himself a philosopher without handing down any precepts of duty? Off. 1.2.5Sed sunt nōn nūllae disciplīnae, quae prōpositīs bonōrum et malōrum fīnibus officium omne pervertant.But there are some schools which, by the ends of good and evil that they propose, overturn all duty. Off. 1.2.5Nam quī summum bonum sīc īnstituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtūte coniūnctum, idque suīs commodīs, nōn honestāte mētītur, hic, sī sibi ipse cōnsentiat et nōn interdum nātūrae bonitāte vincātur neque amīcitiam colere possit nec iūstitiam nec līberālitātem;For he who so lays down the highest good that it has no connection with virtue, and measures it by his own advantage, not by what is honourable, such a man, if he were consistent with himself and were not sometimes overcome by the goodness of his nature, could cultivate neither friendship nor justice nor generosity; Off. 1.2.5fortis vērō dolōrem summum malum iūdicāns aut temperāns voluptātem summum bonum statuēns esse certē nūllō modō potest.but a man who judges pain the greatest evil certainly cannot in any way be brave, nor one who declares pleasure the highest good be temperate.
Off. 1.2.6Quae quamquam ita sunt in prōmptū, ut rēs disputātiōne nōn egeat, tamen sunt ā nōbīs aliō locō disputāta.Although these points are so obvious that the matter needs no discussion, I have nevertheless discussed them elsewhere. Off. 1.2.6Hae disciplīnae igitur sī sibi cōnsentāneae velint esse, dē officiō nihil queant dīcere, neque ūlla officiī praecepta firma, stabilia, coniūncta nātūrae trādī possunt nisi aut ab iīs, quī sōlam, aut ab iīs, quī maximē honestātem propter sē dīcant expetendam.These schools, then, if they wish to be consistent with themselves, could say nothing about duty, and no firm, stable precepts of duty, joined to nature, can be handed down except by those who say that the honourable is to be sought for its own sake, either alone or above all. Off. 1.2.6Ita propria est ea praeceptiō Stōicōrum, Acadēmicōrum, Peripatēticōrum, quoniam Aristōnis, Pyrrhōnis, Erillī iam prīdem explōsa sententia est;Thus that teaching belongs properly to the Stoics, the Academics and the Peripatetics, since the views of Aristo, Pyrrho and Erillus have long since been hissed off the stage; Off. 1.2.6quī tamen habērent iūs suum disputandī dē officiō, sī rērum aliquem dīlēctum relīquissent, ut ad officiī inventiōnem aditus esset.yet they would have their own right to discuss duty if they had left some choice between things, so that there might be a way of approach to the discovery of duty.
Off. 1.2.6Sequēmur igitur hōc quidem tempore et hāc in quaestiōne potissimum Stōicōs nōn ut interpretēs, sed, ut solēmus, ē fontibus eōrum iūdiciō arbitriōque nostrō, quantum quōque modō vidēbitur, hauriēmus.Accordingly, at this time and in this inquiry, I shall follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I shall draw from their springs according to my own judgement and discretion, as much and in whatever manner shall seem good. Off. 1.2.7Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputātiō dē officiō futūra est, ante dēfīnīre, quid sit officium;It seems best, then, since the whole discussion is to be about duty, first to define what duty is; Off. 1.2.7quod ā Panaetiō praetermissum esse mīror.and I am surprised that this was passed over by Panaetius. Off. 1.2.7Omnis enim, quae ratiōne suscipitur dē aliquā rē īnstitūtiō, dēbet ā dēfīnītiōne proficīscī, ut intellegātur, quid sit id, dē quō disputēturFor every systematic treatment of any subject that is undertaken by reason ought to start from a definition, so that it may be understood what it is that is being discussed.