Off. 1.3.1Omnis dē officiō duplex est quaestiō: ūnum genus est, quod pertinet ad fīnem bonōrum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptīs, quibus in omnīs partīs ūsus vītae cōnfōrmārī possit.Every inquiry about duty is twofold: one kind concerns the supreme good, the other lies in the precepts by which the conduct of life can be shaped in every respect. Off. 1.3.1Superiōris generis huius modī sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud aliō maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem.Of the former kind these are examples: whether all duties are absolute, whether one duty is greater than another, and questions of the same kind. Off. 1.3.1Quōrum autem officiōrum praecepta trāduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad fīnem bonōrum, tamen minus id appāret, quia magis ad īnstitūtiōnem vītae commūnis spectāre videntur;But as for the duties whose precepts are handed down, although they concern the supreme good, this is less apparent, because they seem to look more to the ordering of everyday life; Off. 1.3.1dē quibus est nōbīs hīs librīs explicandum.and it is these that I must explain in these books. Off. 1.3.1Atque etiam alia dīvīsiō est officiī.There is also another division of duty. Off. 1.3.8Nam et medium quoddam officium dīcitur et perfectum.For a duty is called both 'middle' and 'perfect'.
Off. 1.3.8Perfectum officium rēctum, opīnor, vocēmus, quoniam Graecī hoc, autem commūne officium vocant καθῆκον vocant.Perfect duty we may call, I think, 'right', since the Greeks call it katorthoma, while this ordinary duty they call kathekon. Off. 1.3.8Atque ea sīc dēfīniunt, ut, rēctum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse dēfīniant;And they define these terms in such a way that they define what is right as perfect duty; Off. 1.3.8medium autem officium id esse dīcunt, quod cūr factum sit, ratiō probābilis reddī possit.middle duty, on the other hand, they say is that for whose performance a plausible reason can be given. Off. 1.3.9Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetiō vidētur, cōnsiliī capiendī dēlīberātiō.Threefold, then, as Panaetius thinks, is the deliberation involved in reaching a decision. Off. 1.3.9Nam aut honestumne factū sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in dēlīberātiōnem cadit;For people are uncertain whether the thing that falls under deliberation is honourable or shameful to do; Off. 1.3.9in quō cōnsīderandō saepe animī in contrāriās sententiās distrahuntur.and in considering this their minds are often pulled apart towards opposing opinions. Off. 1.3.9Tum autem aut anquīrunt aut cōnsultant, ad vītae commoditātem iūcunditātemque, ad facultātēs rērum atque cōpiās, ad opēs, ad potentiam, quibus et sē possint iuvāre et suōs, condūcat id necne, dē quō dēlīberant;Then again they inquire or take counsel whether the thing they are deliberating about conduces or not to the convenience and pleasure of life, to means and abundance of goods, to wealth, to power, by which they may be able to help both themselves and their own; Off. 1.3.9quae dēlīberātiō omnis in ratiōnem ūtilitātis cadit.all of which deliberation falls under the reckoning of advantage.
Off. 1.3.9Tertium dubitandī genus est, cum pugnāre vidētur cum honestō id, quod vidētur esse ūtile;The third kind of uncertainty is when what seems advantageous seems to conflict with the honourable; Off. 1.3.9cum enim ūtilitās ad sē rapere, honestās contrā revocāre ad sē vidētur, fit ut distrahātur in dēlīberandō animus afferatque ancipitem cūram cōgitandī.for when advantage seems to snatch the mind towards itself, and the honourable, on the other hand, to call it back to itself, the result is that the mind is torn in deliberating and brings with it a double-edged anxiety of thought. Off. 1.3.10Hāc dīvīsiōne, cum praeterīre aliquid maximum vitium in dīvidendō sit, duo praetermissa sunt;In this division, although to leave something out is the greatest fault in dividing, two points have been passed over; Off. 1.3.10nec enim sōlum utrum honestum an turpe sit, dēlīberārī solet, sed etiam duōbus prōpositīs honestīs utrum honestius, itemque duōbus prōpositīs ūtilibus utrum ūtilius.for people commonly deliberate not only whether a thing is honourable or shameful, but also, when two honourable things are put forward, which is the more honourable, and likewise, when two advantageous things are put forward, which is the more advantageous.
Off. 1.3.10Ita, quam ille triplicem putāvit esse ratiōnem, in quīnque partēs distribuī dēbēre reperītur.Thus the scheme which he thought threefold is found to need dividing into five parts. Off. 1.3.10Prīmum igitur est dē honestō, sed dupliciter, tum parī ratiōne dē ūtilī, post dē comparātiōne eōrum disserendum.First, then, we must discuss the honourable, but in two ways; then in the same way the advantageous; afterwards the comparison between them.