Amic. 16.1Cōnstituendī autem sunt, quī sint in amīcitiā fīnēs et quasi terminī dīligendī.We must now establish what are the limits, and as it were the boundary-stones, of affection in friendship. Amic. 16.1Dē quibus trīs videō sententiās ferrī, quārum nūllam probō: ūnam, ut eōdem modō ergā amīcum affectī sīmus quō ergā nōsmet ipsōs;On this I see three opinions put forward, none of which I approve: one, that we should feel towards a friend in the same way as towards ourselves; Amic. 16.1alteram, ut nostra in amīcōs benevolentia illōrum ergā nōs benevolentiae pariter aequāliterque respondeat;the second, that our goodwill towards our friends should correspond equally and evenly to their goodwill towards us; Amic. 16.1tertiam, ut, quantī quisque sē ipse facit, tantī fīat ab amīcīs.the third, that however highly each man values himself, so highly should he be valued by his friends. Amic. 16.57Hārum trium sententiārum nūllī prōrsus assentior.With none of these three opinions do I agree at all. Amic. 16.57Nec enim illa prīma vēra est, ut, quem ad modum in sē quisque, sīc in amīcum sit animātus.For that first one is not true, that each should be disposed towards his friend as he is towards himself.
Amic. 16.57Quam multa enim, quae nostrā causā numquam facerēmus, facimus causā amīcōrum!For how many things we do for the sake of friends which we would never do for our own sake! Amic. 16.57Precārī ab indignō, supplicāre, tum acerbius in aliquem invehī īnsectārīque vehementius, quae in nostrīs rēbus nōn satis honestē, in amīcōrum fīunt honestissimē;To beg from an unworthy man, to supplicate, and again to inveigh too bitterly against someone and attack him too vehemently: things which in our own affairs are done not quite honourably are done most honourably in those of our friends; Amic. 16.57multaeque rēs sunt, in quibus dē suīs commodīs virī bonī multa dētrahunt dētrahīque patiuntur, ut eīs amīcī potius quam ipsī fruantur.and there are many matters in which good men take much away from their own advantages, and allow it to be taken away, so that their friends rather than they themselves may enjoy them. Amic. 16.58Altera sententia est quae dēfīnit amīcitiam paribus officiīs ac voluntātibus.The second opinion is the one that defines friendship by equal services and wishes. Amic. 16.58Hoc quidem est nimis exiguē et exīliter ad calculōs vocāre amīcitiam, ut pār sit ratiō acceptōrum et datōrum.This is indeed to call friendship to account too narrowly and meanly, so that the reckoning of what is received and what is given may balance.
Amic. 16.58Dīvitior mihi et affluentior vidētur esse vēra amīcitia nec observāre restrictē nē plūs reddat quam accēperit: neque enim verendum est nē quid excīdat aut nē quid in terram dēfluat aut nē plūs aequō quid in amīcitiam congerātur.True friendship seems to me to be richer and more abundant than that, and not to watch strictly lest it give back more than it has received: for there is no need to fear that something may be lost, or something spill on the ground, or more than is fair be heaped up in friendship. Amic. 16.59Tertius vērō ille fīnis dēterrimus, ut, quantī quisque sē ipse faciat, tantī fīat ab amīcīs.But that third limit is the worst, that however highly each man values himself, so highly should he be valued by his friends. Amic. 16.59Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spēs amplificandae fortūnae frāctior.For often in some men either the spirit is too downcast or the hope of bettering their fortune too broken. Amic. 16.59Nōn est igitur amīcī tālem esse in eum, quālis ille in sē est, sed potius ēnītī et efficere ut amīcī iacentem animum excitet indūcatque spem cōgitātiōnemque meliōrem.It is not, then, the part of a friend to be towards him as he is towards himself, but rather to strive and bring it about that he rouses his friend's fallen spirit and leads him to better hopes and thoughts.
Amic. 16.59Alius igitur fīnis vērae amīcitiae cōnstituendus est, sī prius, quid maximē reprehendere Scīpiō solitus sit, dīxerō.Another limit, therefore, must be set for true friendship, once I have told you what Scipio used most to find fault with. Amic. 16.59Negābat ūllam vōcem inimīciōrem amīcitiae potuisse reperīrī quam eius quī dīxisset ita amāre oportēre ut sī aliquandō esset ōsūrus;He used to say that no saying more hostile to friendship could be found than that of the man who had said that one ought to love as though one would some day hate; Amic. 16.59nec vērō sē addūcī posse ut hoc, quem ad modum putārētur, ā Biante esse dictum crēderet, quī sapiēns habitus esset ūnus ē septem;nor indeed could he be brought to believe that this had been said, as was supposed, by Bias, who was held to be one of the seven wise men; Amic. 16.59impūrī cuiusdam aut ambitiōsī aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam.it was, he said, the opinion of some impure man, or an ambitious one, or one who referred everything to his own power. Amic. 16.59Quōnam enim modō quisquam amīcus esse poterit eī, cui sē putābit inimīcum esse posse?For how will anyone be able to be a friend to a man to whom he thinks he may be an enemy?
Amic. 16.59Quīn etiam necesse erit cupere et optāre ut quam saepissimē peccet amīcus, quō plūrīs det sibi tamquam ānsās ad reprehendendum: rūrsum autem rēctē factīs commodīsque amīcōrum necesse erit angī dolēre invidēre.Nay more, he will have to desire and wish that his friend may do wrong as often as possible, so as to give him the more handles, as it were, for reproach; and on the other hand he will be bound to be vexed, pained and envious at his friends' right actions and good fortune. Amic. 16.60Quā rē hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amīcitiam valet: illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam dīligentiam adhibērēmus in amīcitiīs comparandīs, ut nē quandō amāre inciperēmus eum, quem aliquandō ōdisse possēmus.Wherefore this precept, whoever's it is, serves to destroy friendship: what should rather have been taught is that we should use such care in forming friendships as never to begin to love someone whom we might some day hate. Amic. 16.60Quīn etiam sī minus fēlīcēs in dēligendō fuissēmus, ferendum id Scīpiō potius quam inimīcitiārum tempus cōgitandum putābat.Moreover, even if we had been less fortunate in our choice, Scipio thought we ought to bear with it rather than think of a time of enmity.