Off. 1.7.1Dē tribus autem reliquīs lātissimē patet ea ratiō, quā societās hominum inter ipsōs et vītae quasi commūnitās continētur;Of the three that remain, the most wide-ranging is the principle by which the society of men among themselves and, as it were, the community of life is held together; Off. 1.7.1cuius partēs duae, iūstitia, in quā virtūtis est splendor maximus, ex quā virī bonī nōminantur, et huic coniūncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitātem vel līberālitātem appellārī licet.it has two parts: justice, in which the splendour of virtue is greatest and from which men are called good, and, joined to it, beneficence, which may also be called kindness or generosity. Off. 1.7.1Sed iūstitiae prīmum mūnus est, ut nē cui quis noceat nisi lacessītus iniūriā, deinde ut commūnibus prō commūnibus ūtātur, prīvātīs ut suīs.But the first function of justice is that no one should harm anyone unless provoked by wrong, and next that one should use common things as common and private things as one's own. Off. 1.7.21Sunt autem prīvāta nūlla nātūrā, sed aut vetere occupātiōne, ut quī quondam in vacua vēnērunt, aut victōriā, ut quī bellō potītī sunt, aut lēge, pactiōne, condiciōne, sorte;Now nothing is private by nature, but either by ancient occupation, as with those who once came into empty lands, or by victory, as with those who took possession in war, or by law, agreement, contract or lot; Off. 1.7.21ex quō fit, ut ager Arpīnās Arpīnātium dīcātur, Tusculānus Tusculānōrum;whence it comes about that the land of Arpinum is said to belong to the Arpinates, that of Tusculum to the Tusculans; Off. 1.7.21similisque est prīvātārum possessiōnum discrīptiō.and similar is the allotment of private possessions.
Off. 1.7.21Ex quō, quia suum cuiusque fit eōrum, quae nātūrā fuerant commūnia, quod cuique obtigit, id quisque teneat;Hence, since each man's own comes from what by nature had been common, let each hold whatever has fallen to him; Off. 1.7.21ē quō sī quis sibi appetet, violābit iūs hūmānae societātis.if anyone seeks any of this for himself, he will violate the law of human society. Off. 1.7.22Sed quoniam, ut praeclārē scrīptum est ā Platōne, nōn nōbīs sōlum nātī sumus ortūsque nostrī partem patria vindicat, partem amīcī, atque, ut placet Stōicīs, quae in terrīs gignantur, ad ūsum hominum omnia creārī, hominēs autem hominum causā esse generātōs, ut ipsī inter sē aliīs aliī prōdesse possent, in hōc nātūram dēbēmus ducem sequī, commūnēs ūtilitātēs in medium afferre mūtātiōne officiōrum, dandō accipiendō, tum artibus, tum operā, tum facultātibus dēvincīre hominum inter hominēs societātem.But since, as Plato has finely written, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our existence and our friends a share, and since, as the Stoics hold, all that the earth produces is created for the use of men, while men were born for the sake of men, so that they might be able to benefit one another, in this we ought to follow nature as our guide, to bring common advantages into the common stock by exchanging services, by giving and receiving, and by skills, by labour and by resources to bind fast the fellowship of men with men.
Off. 1.7.23Fundāmentum autem est iūstitiae fidēs, id est dictōrum conventōrumque cōnstantia et vēritās.Now the foundation of justice is good faith, that is, constancy and truthfulness in what is said and agreed. Off. 1.7.23Ex quō, quamquam hoc vidēbitur fortasse cuipiam dūrius, tamen audeāmus imitārī Stōicōs, quī studiōsē exquīrunt, unde verba sint ducta, crēdāmusque, quia fīat, quod dictum est, appellātam fidem.Hence, although this will perhaps seem rather strained to some, let us nevertheless dare to imitate the Stoics, who diligently inquire where words come from, and let us believe that good faith, fides, is so called because what has been said is done, fiat. Off. 1.7.23Sed iniūstitiae genera duo sunt, ūnum eōrum, quī īnferunt, alterum eōrum, quī ab iīs, quibus īnfertur, sī possunt, nōn prōpulsant iniūriam.But there are two kinds of injustice: one of those who inflict wrong, the other of those who, though they can, do not ward off wrong from those on whom it is inflicted. Off. 1.7.23Nam quī iniūstē impetum in quempiam facit aut īrā aut aliquā perturbātiōne incitātus, is quasi manūs afferre vidētur sociō;For he who unjustly attacks someone, spurred on either by anger or by some other passion, seems as it were to lay hands on a comrade; Off. 1.7.23quī autem nōn dēfendit nec obsistit, sī potest, iniūriae, tam est in vitiō, quam sī parentēs aut amīcōs aut patriam dēserat.but he who does not defend or resist the wrong, if he can, is as much at fault as if he were deserting his parents or friends or country.
Off. 1.7.24Atque illae quidem iniūriae, quae nocendī causā dē industriā īnferuntur, saepe ā metū proficīscuntur, cum is, quī nocēre alterī cōgitat, timet nē, nisi id fēcerit, ipse aliquō afficiātur incommodō.And those wrongs which are inflicted deliberately for the purpose of harm often arise from fear, when he who plans to harm another fears that unless he does so he himself will suffer some harm. Off. 1.7.24Maximam autem partem ad iniūriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipīscantur ea, quae concupīvērunt;For the most part, however, men set about doing wrong in order to obtain what they have coveted; Off. 1.7.24in quō vitiō lātissimē patet avāritia.and in this vice greed is the most widespread.