1You see, Marcus my son, the very form and, as it were, the face of the honourable, 'which, if it could be seen with the eyes,' as Plato says, 'would arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.' 1But everything that is honourable arises from one of four parts: for it is concerned either with the perception of truth and with skill, or with preserving human society, giving each his due and keeping faith in contracts, or with the greatness and strength of a lofty and unconquered spirit, or with order and measure in all that is done and said, in which lie moderation and self-control. 1Although these four are bound and intertwined with one another, yet from each of them arise definite kinds of duties: for example, in that part which was described first, in which we place wisdom and prudence, lies the search for and discovery of truth, and this is the proper function of that virtue.
16For the more clearly anyone perceives what is truest in each matter, 16and the more keenly and quickly he can both see and explain the reason for it, the more prudent and wise he is rightly accounted. 16Therefore truth is placed beneath this virtue as, so to speak, the material which it handles and with which it is concerned. 17To the remaining three virtues, on the other hand, the necessary tasks are assigned of procuring and preserving those things on which the activity of life depends, so that both the society and union of men may be maintained, and excellence and greatness of spirit may shine forth, both in increasing resources and in acquiring advantages for oneself and one's own, and much more in disdaining these very things.
17Order, moreover, and consistency and moderation, and the qualities like these, belong to that sphere in which some action is required, not merely activity of the mind. 17For by applying a certain measure and order to the things handled in life, we shall preserve honour and propriety.