1It follows that we must speak of the one remaining part of moral goodness, in which are seen modesty and, as it were, a certain ornament of life, temperance and restraint, every calming of the disturbances of the mind, and due measure in all things. 1Under this heading is contained what can be called in Latin decorum; 1for in Greek it is called prepon. 1Its nature is such that it cannot be separated from the honourable; 94for what is fitting is honourable, and what is honourable is fitting; 94but what kind of difference there is between the honourable and the fitting can be more easily understood than explained. 94For whatever is fitting appears only when moral goodness has gone before it.
94Therefore what is fitting appears not only in this part of moral goodness, which must be discussed here, but also in the three preceding ones. 94For to use reason and speech wisely, to do whatever you do with deliberation, and in every matter to see and maintain what is true, is fitting; whereas to be mistaken, to err, to slip, to be deceived is as unbecoming as to rave and be out of one's mind; 94and all just things are fitting, while unjust things, as they are shameful, so are they unbecoming. 94The case of courage is similar. 94For what is done in a manly way and with a great spirit seems worthy of a man and fitting; what is done otherwise, as it is shameful, so it is unbecoming.
95Therefore this decorum I speak of belongs to all moral goodness, and belongs to it in such a way that it is not perceived by some abstruse reasoning but lies plain to see. 95For there is something, and it is recognised in every virtue, that is fitting; 95and it can be separated from virtue in thought rather than in reality. 95As grace and beauty of body cannot be separated from health, so this decorum we are speaking of is indeed wholly blended with virtue, but is distinguished from it by the mind and by thought. 96Its classification, moreover, is twofold; 96for we recognise a certain general decorum, which is found in all moral goodness, and another subordinate to it, which belongs to the individual parts of moral goodness.
96The former is usually defined roughly thus: that decorum is what is in keeping with man's excellence in that respect in which his nature differs from that of the other living creatures. 96The part, however, that is subordinate to the general they define thus: they would have decorum be what is so in keeping with nature that moderation and self-control appear in it, together with a certain gentlemanly bearing.